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PREFACE
In view of the potenial impact d o National Shelter Program on major policies as well as on
the economy of the Nation and the lives of a l l its citizens, we feel thot th. scientific information presented i n this pamphlut should be made available to a l l those concerned with this
issue.
Approximately 60% of the population lives i n major metropolitan areas, which include cities
and suburbs. It i s to be expected that in case of war these areas w i l l be attacked with
nuclear bombs. As this population cannot be written off completely, shelters must be provided to protect it against blast and heat as we1l as against fallout.
The papers by Salvadori, Paschkis, and Drew (on air supply and shelter) deal with conditions
i n shelters. People in shelters are exposed to radiation even i f they manage to avoid contaminated air from the outside or contamination from late-comers. Yet counting a protection
factor (ratio of radiation outside the shelter to that inside) as only 100, it i s assumed i n this
report that within the shelter the radiation effects will not be considered.
Ullmann computes the cost of such shelters for a population of 120 million, taking as the
structural cost one-half of the maximum mentioned in Salvadai's paper and thus consciously
sacrificing a substantial portion of the urban population. If maximum figures are taken, the
expenditures would be still higher than shown in Ullmann's paper.

After a period, variously estimated at from two weeks to two months, people w i l l have to
Iewe their shelters. The only reason for building shelters in the first place i s supposedly
to allow a society to be rebuilt at least vaguely similar to ours and hence based on technology.
The people leaving shelters will, however, face serious problems. These a n discussed by
Drew (water supply), Yost (radiation effects on the body), Dobzhansky (gene t i c effects:
dangers to future generations) and Melman (industrial potentialities in a post-attack era).
These paperr spell out the hazard upon leaving the sheher and the near-impossibility of
surviva I.

It still might be held that protection, whatever i t s cost, shou Id be attempted even if it saves
only a minute fraction of our popu lation.
However, i n the final paper, Klineberg shows that from a psychological viewpoint shelters.
may not only fail to deter bu~,i n fact, may substantially increase the probability of war.
Eoch author bears the responsibility for his individual contribution to this series
of studies.

COST OF BLAST-RESISTANT STRUCTURES
BY MARIO G. SALVADOR1
Professor of Civil Engineering and Architecture
Columbia University

A bare shelter structure designed to withstand the blast effect of a 20-megaton
nuclear bomb at the rim of the ball of fire would cost $290 per person sheltered.
Because of the o h effects of such a weapon. the structure would not assure
human survival. but would offer protection only against the blast effects. Blast
resistant structures designed to withstand pressures further from the point of dm
tonation would cost relatively less.
The table below gives the cost par sheltered person of the blast structure of a
reinforced concrete box shelter capable of resisting the blast effect of a ground
burst of a 20-magaton nuclear bomb at the given distances from the center of the
explos ion.
COST OF BLAST PROTECTION

2,1

DISTANCE
(miles from
ground zero)

2.9

OVER PRESSURE 80
(Ibs per square inch)

COST

$290

(per person)

The reinforced concrete box gives 10 square feet of space per person and i s 9 feet
inches high, thus permitting four bunks to be stacked one above the other. Its
modular span i s 14 feet. 300 pounds of material per square foot, including the concrete ncb ded for strength. are assumed over the shelter roof for radiation protection.
The walls of the shelter are designed to resist the pressure of the blast wave
traveling through the earth. The f l w r of the shelter i s 6 inches thick. No elaborate
foundations are assumed to be required to resist the pressure blast on the shelter.

6

The reinforced concrete structure i s so designed as to barely resist the blast; that
is. so as to collapse for a small amount of pressure above that produced by a 20
megaton bomb.
The cost of the structure includes the necessary excavation in an average soil,
and a 10% contingency increase to cover the cost of the openings. No elaborate
door system, which may be needed for other than blast resistanceB i s considered
i n this cost.
The price of concrete i s assumed at $80 per cubic yard; it includes an average of
6 pounds of steel per cubic foot of concrete and the cost of forms.

The study conducted to calculate the table given qbove shows that the cost of
the structure per person i s insensitive to the number of persons sheltered: the
table was obtained as an average of costs for shelters to be occupied by 5, 20,
50, 100 and0500persons. For large shelters to be occupied by hundreds of persons
the structural cost may be halved in view of the possibility of organizing sleeping
shifts,
The range of distances for which the shelter gives protection against the blast
goes from (the limit of the fire ball (2.1 mites) to the distance at which a standard
c i v i l structure could stand the blast (1 pound per square inch of pressure). The
cost of the structure at this outer limit i s due exclusively to the need of radiation
protection. The costs evaluated above are to be considered as low averages over
the continental United States, and check the results of similar pub1ished studies.

A NEW LOOK AT THERMAL CC"7ITIn'1S IN f"'ELTERS
BY VICTOR PASCHKIS
Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Director of
Heat and Mass Flow Analyzer Laboratory
Columbia University
Temperatures within fallout or blast shelters have not been fully explored. This
has been acknowledged in papers presented before Congressional Committees. This
paper seeks to explore four items of danger in connection with shelter temperatures.
Three of these are influenced by the direct heat radiation of a nuclear bomb explosion, The fourth i s not.

I. Thermal Radiation from ihe Bomb
A l l nuclear explosions occur at temperatures prevailing i n the sun. Exposure to
such tamperatUres even for seconds i s lethal within a wide distance from the explosion. As this study deals with the effectiveness of shelters, the danger toexposed
persons w i l l not be explored further. People i n shelters which are strong enough to
withstand the blast w i l l be safe against this direct heat exposure.

11. Heating of Shelters chrough rheir Roofs

'

The extremely high temperatures owing to thermal radiation w i l l ignite a l l inflammable material to great distances. How far out (from ground zero) combustion w i l l occur depends mainly on the size of the bomb, the nature of the inflammable material, and on the height of the explosion from the ground. Charts
1 and 2 show the distance to which ignition, characterized by crumpled newspaper catching fire, may be expected for different bomb sizes and for an explosion in'the air and on the surface. These charts (based on information i n the
McGraw-Hi ll study, *'Nuclear Attack and Industrial Survival," Jan. 1962) also
indicate the area, i n square miles, thus destroyed.
Depending on wind conditions, and to some extent on the nature of the terrain,
one must expect that the many individual fires started by the ignition of combustible material w i l l consolidate either into a firestorm or conflagration.
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5.5

0
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0
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The firestonn i s essentially limited to the area originally ignited by the many
small fires (the areas designated on the charts). A-conflagration extends beyond the
original confines of the fires started by the bomb. The duration of eiiher the firestorm or conflagration i s unpredictable. Estimates of several authors vary from six
hours to several weeks. Temperature near the center of a firestorm i s above 2200
degrees Fahrenheit; In Hamburg, following a firestorm ignited by incendiary bombs
in 1943, an inspectiun of shelters showed h a t glass had been melted (2000-2300
degrees F). This observation can be used as a r o w h gauge of the prevailinp
temperatwe.
As a result of the blast, and partly as a result of the fire, a l l structures in the
zone of the firestorm must be expected to collapse. Thus any shelters in such
arm will be covered by rubble. This rubble, mixed with s t i l l smoldering material,
will remain hot for extended periods of time
possibly several weeks.

--

The roof of a shelter will receive heat, first from the firestorm and then from the
hot rubble. Fortunately, thi s heatflow produces in the she1ter a temperature
rise of only a few degrees. It i s well to remember that i f the thickness of the
r o i l a d roof were decreused to less than the three feet assumed in the paper by
Professor Salvadori, the thermal condition may become serious. Furthermore,
such effects increase the shelter requirements for reasons similar to those described
in the following section.

Ill. Vmtilaiion Air
One cannot expect shelters to be provided with bottled air or oxygen to such an
extent as to eliminate all nssd for fresh air. Fallout shelter designs always include a vent which must be kept tightly closed during the firestorm. Otherwise
the firestonn would draw air out of the shelter, asphyxiating i t s inhabitants. If
the wind should drive air into the shelter, it would be air at 2 0 0 0 O F, which
would bum h e lungs of occupants tmmdiately (electric cremation furnaces
operate at a temperature of about 16000F).
During the storm and h e collapse of adiacmt structures the vent i s in great
danger. A hole can be knocked or bumed into the vent, opening the shelter to
the infusion of hot air laden with radioactive debris. Or the vent can be
damaged so that it will not open when the firestorm i s over.

It i s practically unavoidable that the vent, at least in its lower part, will be
surrounded by rubble. Assuming that the vent remains undamaged, it will have
to be opened eventually to let air in. The hot rubble surrounding the vent will
then preheat the air flowing through the vent. The extent to which this p r c
heating will take place cannot be predicted and depends, among other things,
on the temperature of the rubble which may remain at 1,200° F for a long time.
Air temperatures of several hundred degrees are possible. As thi s temperature
i s not known, the results of two extremely low estimates (300F and SO0 F
temperature r i se due to exposure of the rubble) are examined in chart 3. The
increase will be more severe in larger shelters because the surface area of the
shelter per inhabitant goes down as the shelter size increases. (This statement
i s based on a constant floor area per inhabitant and a standard height of the
rhelter.)

Chart

3

Temperature Rise

DAYS

The curves in chart 3 are basedon an air supply of five cubic feet per minute
per person--a figure recommended by Broida ("Effect of Mass Fires on
Personnel in Shelters": Technical Paper #XI, U.S. Forest Service, A u ~ .1960).
In normal life within small spaces, a figure of 15 cubic feet per minute per person
i s recommended (see "Guide" of the American Society of Heating and Ventilating
Engineers, 1961 edition). The greater the air intake, the greater i s the amount of
heat carried i4tO the shelter.

For each air temperature rise two curves are shown, val id for a 20-person shelter

'

(14x14ft.;9.5ft.high)andfora500-personrhelt~r(70x72ft;9.5ft.

high).

Thus for air 300 F above shelter temperature (e.0. shelter at 700 F; air intake, due
to preheat in the hot rubble at 100OF) the shelter with 500 people w i l l reach a
temperature increase of 30° f in about one day, while the smaller (20 person) shelter
w i l l reach the same temperature i n 3.5 days.The curves take into cansideration
thatooch body generates about 400 btuhr. (BTU i s a measure of heat.)
The tolerance of the human body to elevated temperatures depends on a number of
circumstances, among which humidity i s particularly important. In the shelter, because of perspiration, the humidity will be high, and heat tolerance w i l l be rather
low.

K. Buettner (ASME paper 57 SA-20) indicates that under high humidity exposure
to 9S0 F i s safe for about'l0 hrs., and to 900F for about 100 hrs. Assuming an
20 30° F becomes dangerous for a
initial shelter temperature of 70° F, a

-

protracted stay in the shelter.

IV. Heat Generation by the Body
What are the chances of survival in a shelter far away from any explosion?

It i s known that nuclear weapons cause fa1lout which may drift great distances
from the initial blast location. The only plausible claim for fallout shelters i s that
they w i l l protect the population not living in obvious target areas, i.e., near any
metropolitan area or significant military installation. In this case it is assumed that
there would be no danger from fires, provided that --contrary to some serious
the conflagration does not feed on forests and fields. Yet even such
predictions
favorable locations present a serious thermal problem. As long as the shelter is
sealed in order to avoid intake of air laden with radioactive particles, the heat generated by i t s inhabitants w i l l raise the shelter temperature. This temperature rise
will reach dangerous levels in a few days, depending on the size of the shelter. The
curves i n Chart 3 marked "No Air Intake" hold for this condition,and show that
the shelter temperature becomes unbearable after two days in large shelters and
after seven days i n small shelters.

--

One might suggest that the air be filtered to eliminate the radioactive particles.
But a filter would increase the power required for the air intake fan. As one cannot
count on electricity in the shelter, the fan would have to be hand operated. Hand
power may not suffice to draw air through an adequate filter. If air or oxygen can be
provided in the shelter, the vent may be kept closed.

The temperature rise in the shelter may be reduced by increasing the surface area
of the shelter per occupant. The area of the 500-person shelter would have to be
about 2.5 to 3 times larger than presently contemplated. This means the shelter of
70 x 72 ft. thpt i s 9.5 ft. i n height would have to be replaced by one 180 x 78 ft.
which i s 25 ft. in height to meet the minimum of 2.5 times the original surface area.
If introduction of air which i s preheated by rubble i s considered, the dimensions
would have to be much larger.

AR
I SUPPLY FOR SHELTERS
BY T.B. DREW
Professor of Chemical Engineering
Columbia University

The primary requirements for shelter vehti lation are:
( 1 ) Means of preventing air inflow for perhaps up to two days after a nuclear
attack has ended.

(2) Means thereafter, without dependence upon mechanical power, to draw in and
expel1 air for a week or so.
During the first period, the problem i s not so much that of preventing the entry of
radioactive dust as it i s that of preventing the entry of air heated by the probable
fire storm to dangerously high temperatures.
The initial period may be much more than two days because it starts at the beginning
of the attack. It may be possible to maintain the air in the sealed shelter sufficiently pure to avoid suffocation. This would require numerous shallow, open pans
of a chemical such as moist lime to absorb carbon dioxide and tanks of compressed
air or oxygen to replenish that taken in by the occupants.

The second period requires the provision of relatively large passages to the exterior so designed that they may be cleared of rubble, which might block them, and

that they may be kept tightly closed dbring the initial period.
There i s no practicable means of filtering out the fine particles which would remain ,
suspended i n the air af ter two days. Therefore some contamination of the she1ter by fine,
possibly radioactive, dust w i l l occur u n a ~ o i d a b i ~ .

It might appear likely that by suitable design of the air exit a small heat supply can
create sufficient stack effect to maintain adequate ventilation. Very possibly
the body heat of the inhabitants added to heat evolved by lighting equipment and
any powered equipment w i l l be sufficient in itself to create the stack effect.

In an intense nuclear attack some radioactive gases w i l l be produced. These cannot be removed from the air supply by any known practicable means.

COST OF A NATIONAL
SHELTER PROGRAM - IN DOLLARS
BY JOHN

E. ULLMANN

Professor and Chairman,
Department of Management, Marketing,
and Business Statistics
Hofstra College, Hempstead, New York
This section summarizes the costs developed in the preceding technical papers
and traces the probable totals and their effects on the economy if a program of
this magnitude i s put into practice.
First, it has been assumed that 120 million people am to be sheltered. This s t i l l
leaves about 60 million without deep shelters but they are expected to be either
in areas where direct blast and fire effects are not likely to be great, or to have
to participate in waging the war on the surface as long as possible. This assumption would give some degree of protection to that 66% of the population that would
likely be killed under one pattern of a 10,000 megaton attack (See McGraw H i l l
study, Jan. 1962, based on data by AEC, Rand Corporation and Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy). No provision has been made for double shelters at home and
at work. This might require at least another 20 million places, especially in metropo1itan area s.
Shelters are assumed to be of two alternative sizes. They rely on stored commodities
which compromises their usefulness once they are "depleted"
it may be impossible
to restock them. In general, a two-week to two-month soiourn in the shelter might be
expected, but to provide the survivors with a bare start of necessities in a hostile,

-

post-attack world, food and water stores have been set at six months (see Ralph
Lapp, Consumers Report, Jan. 1962, pp. 15-18). Even if the food supplies were
for a two-month period only, the food costs would not be changed materially. No
provision has k e n made for repeat attacks.
Land:

The cost of land obviously depends on the location of the shelters. If in urban
areas, existing structures would have to be razed. There are not enough parks,
vacant land, etc. to accomodate any large number of shelters. If they are not
right in the city, the urban population would be unable to reach them. As shown
by Professor Paschkis, a 500-person shelter would occupy one-third of an acre.
The cost of land for a single shelter would thus probably range from $20,000
to $500,000 or much more. Millions of dollars might be involved at some
sites. Therefore an average amount of $150,000 for each SO-person shelter
would not be excessive. A 20-person shelter might be housed on suburban property at little inaementol costs. Neverthekss, many would require the razing of
cat least one house. A land cost of $8,000 is, therefore, a fair estimak.
To sum up, land costs will be:
For

20 persons

58,OOo

For 500 persons
$150,000

Basic Shelter Stnrctum, excluding access:

The basic shelter structure is based on one-half the maximum estimate by Professor
Salvadori; that is, $145 per person. This still results in structural collapse within

an area of 45 square miles for a 20-megaton bomb and may thus producs millions of
casualties in several cities. Reducing this to 14 square miles would double the cost.
In addition, the shelter will be scaled up to avoid the thermal problem d w l t with by
Professor Paschkis. Accordingly, a structure cost of 2.5 times $145 or $362.50 per
person i s derived. The only alternative would be to provide some form of air conditioning which is ruled out by the high pow.rrequirements. Moreover, its cost would
be considerable.
For 500 persons
For 20 persons

Shelter access:
The cost estimates for this must necessarily be approximate. One of the reasons
for locating shelters away from existing structures i s to avoid, as far as possible,
major blocking of the access. Even so, entrance tunnels can cave in. No generally applicable method of egress has been des&ibed thus far. Blasting out with
shaped charges and similar methods require highly skilled personnel. It i s thus
only possible to rely on heavily reinforced entrances with mazes to block radiation and with blast doors, built like vault doors. The costs of these special
products and structures w i l l certainly aggregate at least $400 per person for the

20-person shelter and $100 per person for the 500 person shelter. The latter
would have t o have multiple exits; six have been assumed here.
For

20 persons

For

$8,000

500 persons
$50,000

Air Supply and Electric light:

A two-week air supply i s necessary here to avoid intake of air heated by surface
rubble (see Professor Paschkis' paper). A system using bottled compressed air and
hydrated lime absorption of carbon dioxide i s considered here. This would have to
include controls for air pressure inside the shelter, venting of stale air, some small
source of power for air circulation and similar equipment. A small amount of lighting
i s included (5watts per person). Such a system would have to be developed and it
could probably not be built and stocked for less than $1,000 per person. Recovering
oxygen from the carbon dioxide would require a large power source and chemical unit,
costing at least that much. If a stay longer than two weeks i s needed, however, it
would have to be considered. Even so, the problems cited by Professor Drew would
largely remain.
Cost of air supply and electric light would be:
For

20 persons

For

500 persons
$500,000

Water supply and sanitation:

A water supply of two gulloris per perwn per day has been assumed. This compares
with 25 gallons per person per day used in (lome design. The simplest way would be
to have a reservoir with the shelter in which a two-month supply could be stored.
This does not deal with the limitations on post-attack' water supply cited by Professor Drew. No allowance i s made for artesian wells and the like. An alternative
'&month supply should therefore be conkdcred. The cost of the water itself is
neglected, but the reservoir would costabout $1.50 per cubic foot. The cost of the
simple hand pumps may be assumed induded in this figure.
An equal space i s provided. for waste products. This i s required to drain the
chemical toilets used in the first instance. The foll.owing costs are involved:
I

For
For six-month period:
Water supply, 182 days at two
gal Ions per day (75 gal Ion per
cubic foot and $1.50 per cubic
foot 'for reservoir) $72.75 per
person
. .
Sewage p i t (some as ab-ove)
. . ..

*

:.u

'foi eaih-

Chenrical toilets (one
20 persons) a?$79 - '

..

..

-

,

.

20 persons

For

500 persons

Food:

The average food expenditures for a worker's family range from $1 to $1.25 per
person per day (1961 Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 337). If processed
agricultural surplus, already paid for by the government, i s used, only a processing,
handling and storage charge of 35 cents per person a day i s estimated. As noted before, a six month supply i s provided.
Thus, food costs would be as follows:
For
Food (354 per day,

182 days)

20 persons

For

$1,275

500 persons
$31,950

Storage space (2 cubic feet per
person per week @ $1.50 per cubic
feet) 26 weeks

Food preparation:

Al lowance for food preparation, equipment and utensi Is $3 per person:
For

20 persons

For

$60

500 persons
$~,500

Medicol supplies:

A shelter would have to be equipped with medical supplies far more elaborate than
the conventional "first aid kits." At the least, one would have to provide tranqui lizers, sedatives, antibiotics, digestive aids, anesthetics, as well as supplies for
treating injuries, and, i f then available, radiation. An estimate of $15 per person i s
certainly reasonable.
The totals for medical supplies and their storage are:
For

20 persons

For

500 persons
$7.500

Tools, utensils, and instrumentation:
Here are included various tools for use i n the shelter as we1l as outside. These
include radiation instruments, "fallout suits," flashlights and batteries, fire extinguishers, axes, picks, shovels, hand tools, etc. An allowance of $40 per person
i s reasonable here. The totals including storage space are therefore:
For

20 persons
$800

For 500 persons
$20,000

Furniture:
Only the simplest bunks and personal lockers, etc. are envisaged, at a cost of
about $15 per person. This gives a total of:
For

20 persons

For

500 persons

THE TOTALS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
The shelters are estimated to cost about $50,500 for 20 persons and $1,063,400
for 500 persons, or from $2,125 to $2,525 per place. Applying this to the prospective shelter population of 120 million, we would have a cost of $254 to $302
billion. This i s in the range of our present national debt and m a t h i r d of the total
value of our structures in place. It would be about five times the total annual volume
of construction. It i s five to six times our annual collection of personal income tax
and bears the same relation to our current defense expenditures. It is, in fact,
about equal to our total annual personal income.
Our national debt was increased by $243 billion between 1940 and 1947. In that
time the value of the dollar was halved. A shelter program such as this would
have to be put in place in about two years to have military value. Such pressure,
coupled with the limitations of our industrial capacity in several areas of potential
supply, would require us to submit to controls over our property, our labor, and
our daily lives more thorough than ever devised by any society, least of a l l the
schools, hospitals,
United States. It would mean the end of a l l other construction
houses, factories, machinery and armaments. As it is, no restrictions due to s c h d w
ling, industrial preparation and the like are considered. Even if the above estimate,
which is based on current dollars, were to be high by as much as one half, this would
'
would have to be
still be true. In fact, to alleviate the shortco
- .+p '% !m-fl
pi*
substantially increased.
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A parallel effort to secure industrial reserves, communications, etc. would at
least double these amounts. At the same time there would be a precipitous drop
in the international value of the dollar, impairing the financial stability of the
whole West.

Anyone who~treasuresthe freedoms we have, who believes that our varied and
versatile industrial establishment i s a major source of strength and who eniays
the good things our country has to offer, cannot but be appal Id at the possibility.

WATER SUPPLY IN POST-ATTACK PERIOD
BY T.B. DREW
Professor of Chemical Enginmting
Columbia University

''Water,

water everywhere
And all the boards did shrink,
Water, water everywhere
Nor any drop to drink."
--from Rime of the Ancient Mariner
by Samuel Taylor Coleridge

The pressing problem of water supply arises of t w the immediate post-attack period.
The provision of canned or barrel Id watw for a week or so inside a shelter appear s
both possible and practical. The renewal of the supply raises life and death problems.
Prudent planning must assume not only that water mains wi ll have been broken, but
also that reservoirs and their watersheds, along with shallow wells, will have been
grossly contaminated by the deliberate use of '@dirtybombs." Such bombs might
be designed to deposit di fficult-to-remove isotopes.

The only source of potable water for some weeks would be from deep artesian
we1Is. These, in most cases, would remain uncontaminated indefinitely because
the soil through which water percolates over long distances has some natural ion
exchange and fi ltratim capacity.
On the other hand, the decontamination of reservoirs and watershed can may be
accomplished only by time and the action of rainfall. Ordinary water-treating
techniques wi ll not necessari ly suffice to reduce the contamination. Furthermore,
unless they have been locally stored, common water-treating chemicals will not
be available.
The suggestion for using ion-exchange resins for decontaminating water supplies,
though appealing, i s largely illusory. It depends either upon the availability of
replacement resin or upon the independent availability of pure water to revivl*
the resin.
The anticipated result of a widespread attack would entail such destruction of
industry and transportation facilities that replacement of resin from other than
locally buried stores could not be assumed.
Prudent planning requires that deep wells, from 100 to 200 feet, be drilled in
advance. Because in many areas the water table i s so low that hand pumping i s not
feasible and no power from mechanical sources would be available, substantial
stores of fuel must be laid in. This would ba used for internal combustion engines
for pumping.
After a somewhat indeterminate, but moderute, period, rainwater would be reasonably potable cnd, in regions of adequate rainfall, could replace the deep wells if
decontaminated receiving basins could be devised by the survivors.

BY HENRY

T. YOST, JR.

Associate Professor of Biology
Amherst College

In a certain sense, the people ot the northern hemi sphere are part of a gigantic
experiment to determine the effects of irradiation at low levels. Until the results
of this experiment are in, we w i l l not be able to point to sufficiently large stores
of data to say exactly what w i l l happen. On the other hand, the information we
have, and the thaory on which our investigations are now based, indicates that
any exposure to radiation i s harmful.
To think that we can escape some effects of radiation i s greatly misleading. We
are i n a position similar to traffic safety officers who are setting a speed limit.
A limit of 40 miles per hour does not mean that no one w i l l die or be seriously
injured at that speed; it means that we are willing to tolerate a certain amount of
damage which we predict w i l l come i f the speed limit i s not exceeded.
The recommended level for the exposure of human beings i s such a "speed limit".
We agree that no one should get more than 10 r i n his reproductive lifetime (about
40 years). We say that this i s "safe" because we can see no easy way to lower
the dose at this time, and we know that human populations have been willing to
,

pay the price for such an exposure i n the past. It i s a tolerable dose; a dose
which contributes to the infirmaties of present-day man and to the heritable abnormalities of the future.
When we turn our attention to the prospects of nuclear war, we pass the bounds of
I I
safe'' doses altogether. It seems highly unlikely that the average dose received
by sheltered survivors on the eastern coast of the United States could be less
than 200 r. In fact, the report of the Rand Corporation on radiation protection continually refers to 200 r as the nationwide average dose to be received. In the case
of a 10,000 megaton attack this seems conservative. It i s obvious that there w i l l
be cases where radiation levels are much lower than thi s. It i s also clear that more
effective shelters might be bui It, if the money were available and the enemy
cooperative enough to keep his attack to some presupposed level; but the 200 r
level i s so frequently quoted, and so consistent with the available estimates of
dose-rates after a nuclear attack, that it i s realistic to confine our discussion of
the effects of radiation to this level.
The immediate effects of exposure would depend to a great extent upon the rate
at which the dose was given. If the survivors received 200 r over the first month
after the attack, the effects would be quite similar to the effects from an instantaneous dose. Nausea and hair shedding would be most pronounced. In fact the
shedding of hair i s one of the best indications of exposure to radiation. As a
general rule, when the hair grows back the exposed individual w i l l recover from
most of the immediate effects of radiation. Failure of the hair to return i s an
indication of serious damage,

A dose of 10 r received i n a relatively short period of time (a few weeks) would

be expressed i n a depression of the white cell count of the blood and in a slight
decrease in the production of anti bodies (those molecules which are produced to
fight infection). At a dose of 100 r, radiation sickness i s quite evident, although
recovery w o ~ l dbe assured for 90-9596 of those exposed. At levels of 200r, about
15% of the population would die from alteration of the blood forming elements
and general radiation sickness.
Another effect which cannot be neglected and which would be significant in the
100-200 r dose range i s lowered resistance to infection. It i s to be expected that
some areas o f the intestine would undergo shedding of the lining which prevents
germs (always present i n our food) from entering the blood stream. The result
would be an increased incidence of ordinary infectious diseases i n the surviving
population. This effect would be coupled with a decreased anti body production
and a lowered capacity of the organism to repair tissue damage brought about
by impaired cellular activity. Thus, secondary illness w i l l be a problem for the
inhabitants of the shelters, both i n the shelter and af tar emergence from shelter.
The long range effects of exposure to radiation are even more serious. Through
a mechanism which i s not completely understood, the effects of radiation are
stored i n the body to a degree which results i n a shortening of the l i f e span.
This l i f e span shortening can be estimated by the rule that 1 r w i l l decrease the
the life expectancy by 1 1 0 days. An exposure of 200 r would cut between 1000
and 2000 days from the l i f e span, on the average.
In addition to this, the incidence of a l l types of cancer would be expected to
increase. The first reports of the research committee on tumor statistics from
Hiroshima indicate that the dose necessary to double the incidence of cancers
of a l l types i s about 400 r. Therefore, we must expect that survivors in shelters
wi ll show a 2540% increase i n the incidence of cancers of a l l types.
Leukemia should be considered separately, as it i s apparently one of the "genetic"
effects of radiation in somatic tissue. While there i s undoubtedly a threshold for
the increase in most types of cancer, there i s every indication that none exists
for leukemia, that is, any dose of radiation w i l l increase the incidence of this
disease. Moreover, the doubling dose for leukemia seems to be lower than for a l l
types of cancer combined; therefore we must expect that the incidence of leukemia
among the survivors w i l l be very greatly increased.
Sterility i s another important somatic effect of radiation. Women are more sensitive
than men, in this respect. A dose of 200 r w i l l induce temporary sterility in males
from which a slow recovery would be expected. (However, recovery i s frequently
not complete and we would expect a lowering of fertility.) On the other hand, recent
evidence indicates that female sterility i s permanent when induced. This i s not
surprising, as the number of cells involved i n the production of eggs i s less than
the number involved i n the production of sperm. At a dose of 200 r, we can estimate,
conservatively, that 2550% of the surviving females wi ll be steri la.
There are a number of other somatic effects to be expected i n this dose range, but
since they are less important, they w i l l be only briefly mentioned here. Pregnant
women w i l l have to anticipate a relatively high chance of stillborn or deformed
babies. Doses as low as 20 r are known to interfere with the normal developmental

processes. The younger the developing chi Id is, the more susceptible it will be.
Hormonal imbalance i s a short-range but likely event following exposure. This
may result in noticeable changes in certain individuals who are already below par.
The blood clotting mechanism will be altered, with fhe result that cuts and bruises
may be mom serious and in extreme cases internal hemorrhaging may result.
Finally, the effect on the nervous 'system i s not clear. While no maior changes are
to be expected, there have been a number of reports of changms in certain subtle bra
brain functions after exposure. What this might mean to a surviving population in
a r e s t r i d shelter or emerging to the desolation following the attack i s a problem
which only the event itself can answer.
The dose which will k i l l a l l of the population i s 1,000 r (about one half of the
population would die at 450 r). This dose i s unlikely for people in shelters. However, unsheltered people, animals and plants would receive doses far i n excess
of this. Thus we must assume that other somatic effects can be neglected in their
case. They would be dead. The consequence of this for the survivors i s obvious.
Pine trees are killed at doses of 5,000 r; a l l mammals ond birds will be killed by
1,000 r. Clearly, the somatic effects of radiation on the sheltered survivors w i l l
be most drastically expressed through the effect on non-sheltered life.
As serious as these effects are, it i s clear that the somatic effects of radiation
are the most manageable of a l l the consequences of a nuclear war. This i s not
surprising as fall-out shelters have been designed to meet iust this problem.
Unfortunately, this aspect is the least important effect of nuclear warfare. Blast,
fire and genetic effects are far more important. What the shelter can do, at best,
i s to preserve the lives of a certain percentage of the population out of the blast
and fire areas. It cannot reconstruct the devastated areas, resurrect the animals
and plants for food production, or remove the radioactivity from the soil. It i s
essential to realize that preoccupation with the somatic effects of radiation has
lead most people from a consideration of the essential problems.

It i s time to forget an expensive and largely futile effort to solve one of the least
important problems of a nuclear attack.

,

DAMAGE THAT WEAKENS UX II-1 ..iN SPECIES
BY THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY
Professor of Zoology
Columbia University
One of the consequences of exposing people to high-energy radiation, such as
would be released by a nuclear bomb explosion, would be genetic radiation damage.
The generalized effect of such damage i s to increase the incidence of defective
heredity.
Defective heredity, i n normal incidence, i s the cause of much human misery. It i s
responsible for hereditary diseases, some of them grave and many incurable. It
produces a variety of malformations and of bodi ly defects. It weakens vitality,
vigor, intellectual abi Iity, and resi stance to infections. Obviously any increase
in the incidence of hereditary defects i n human populations would mean greater
mi se ry for more people.

--

--

mutations
i n the materials
Defective heredity arises through changes
transmitted i n the sex cells from generation to g.neration, from parents to their
children. Mutations, of course, have always been going on i n the human species
as i n a l l other living species.
But radiation damage may greatly increase what may be considered the normal
i n c l h c e of mutations and thus add to the burden of defectivg heredity. Such
damage inflicted i n our time w i l l harm our descendants for many generations
to come.
There i s no such thing as a safe or permissible radiation exposure as far as genetic
radiation damage i s concerned. No matter how small, a radiation exposure has a
proportionate chance to cause mutations.

If many people i n the world are exposed to genetically damaging radiation, those
not exposed can have l i t t l e confidence of breeding a strong line of decendants.
The reason i s that harmful mutants can appear among their decendants whose
ancestors from another line may have been exposed.
This should serve to bring home to us that genetic radiation damage i s not a
private affair of this or that person or family.

It i s a concern of the whole of mankind.
Why i s genetic radiation damage such a serious matter? After all, defective
heredity has always been with us. It arises by mutation without known radiation
exposure. Radiation damage merely increases the load of hereditary defects. I f
the damage i s small, tbe increase w i l l be small.
But w i l l it be negligible?
Thi s depends upon one's ethical standards. Is one human l i f e lost or made miserable by hereditary disease or weakness to bc considered "negligible?" How many
human lives should be sacrificed? Is it right to make more people suffer because

*

some peop e w ~ l suffer
l
anyway?
Biological science, and particularly genetics, has a lot to learn about genetic
radiation damage. As i s almost always the case in rapidly developing fields of
science, there i s much d i scussion and even sagreanent among geneticists about
some issues. But there i s practical l y unanimous agreement among competent
people that high-energy radiation does cause genetic damage.

4

Big or little, this damage i s undesirable-
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- - IIIS'ISTRIAL SYSTEM UNDER A ::'_'CLEAR ATTACK
BY SEYMOURMELMAN
Associate Professor of Industrial and Managemen
Engineering, Columbia University

A nuclear attack of modest size could destroy, by fire effect alone, more than
two-thirds of the manufacturing facilities of the United States.
This conclusion, conservatively drawn, would mean the destruction of thi s country
as a viable industrial system. The reason i s that whatever industry remained
would be without the intricate web of supplies and services that are essential for
i t s operation.
An upprai sal of the impact of nuclear war on the American industrial system requires an understanding of the nature and the extent of industrial division of
labor and interdependence.
The condition of specialization and interdependence i n American industry was
strikingly presented by Professor Wassily W. Leontief and others in a series of
input-output studies of our economy1. A second example of this condition emerges
from a simple analysis of the sources of supply that contribute to the stock of a
single New York City supermarket.
The following tabulations, based on the Leontief studies, record the condition of
dependency of the industries that produce apparel, buildings, and transportation

equipment. In each case there i s listed the industries whose products are necessary inputs for the operation of the three main industries:

/

Agriculture and fishing
Industrial and heating equipment
Merchandise and service machines
Iron and steel products

Petroleum products and refining
Coal and coke
Manufactured gas and electric power
Communications

APPAREL INDUSTRY

Pulp and paper
Textile mill products

requires inputs from
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Construction
Miscel laneous transportation
Trade (domestic)
Business and personal services

riculture and fishing

Agricultural machinery
Engines and turbines
Motor vehicles
Industrial and heating equipment
Electrical equipment
lron and steel products
Non-ferrous metal s

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
requires inputs from

Non-metallic minerals
Petroleum products and refining
Coal and coke
Manufactured gas and electric power
Lumber and timber products

Mi scel laneous manufacturing
Business and personal services

Iron and Steel foundry products

TRANSPORTATION EQUlPMENT INDUSTRY
requires input from:

Non-f errous metal s
Non-metallic minerals
Petroleum products and refining
Coal and coke
Manufactured gas and electric power

This analysis means that when even one or two important inputs, such as power,
are unovai lable, the industry cannot function.
Regional analysis of industrial operations discloses important concentrations in
particular states and localities. The manufacturing plants of the crucial machinetool industry, for example, are concentrated in Ohio, Michigan, Connecticut, and
Vermont. In these regions the most important concentrations further occur i n major
metropolitan centers.

.
Accordingly, destruction of production facilities in the major industrial centers
has a more extensive effect than i s indicated by the value of the industrial assets
that have been destroyed or the value of the industrial output that has been curtailed.
Where the outputs of an industry an crucial to many others, as in the case of
machine tools, the deranging effect from curtailment of production is multiplied
into many other industrial sectors and regions as well.
Another view of the condition of industrial interdependence in our society i s seen
from a set of observations in a grocery supermarket located at 125th Street and
Amsterdam Avenue in New York City.

A l l together there were about 2500 separate named items on the packaged goods
shelves of that supermarket. Of these lo%
were examined for location of processing plants from which the items originated. The 251 sampled items were shipped
from 94 processing locations in the United States and five overseas.
Twenty-nine states were sources of supply. The maximum number of items from
any location was 42 that location was New York City, itself. The map on the
following page illustrates the variety of sources of supply in this supermarket
from within the continental United States.

-

Much the same pattern of supply sources would hold for every sizeable supermarket
in the country.

Effects d a Nuclear Attack on U.S. industry
With this condition of far-reaching interdependence of our economic system firmly
established i n our minds, let us now postulate what'would happen under a hypothetical nuclear attack.
For purposes of this analysis we assume an attack on 65 maior metropolitan industrial centers by means of 20 megaton warheuds (or their equivalent in thermal
effects) on each center. It w i l l be noted that three warheads of 1-megaton each
would produce even greater thermal effects than a single 20-megattn warhead. It
wi ll be noted also that the total megatonage (1,300) used in this hypothetical attack
i s slightly less than the amount that was said to be gRweilwithin the capabilities
of a potential aggressorJ' at the June, 1959 hearings of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy.'
This analysis i s deliberately conservative, taking into account only the fire effect
from such an attack and omitting effects owing to blast, radiation, and fallout.
The fire effect from each 20-megaton warhead (or i t s equivalent in fire effect) i s
assumed to be a 25 mile radius around the center. This distance i s within the
outer limit of areas for third degree burns for human beings from 20 megaton exAs a third degree burn
plosions, as estimated by the Atomic Energy Commi~sion.~
means the charring of the full thickness of the skin, it i s assumed that the heat
would be sufficient to set fire to many flammable materials within the assumed
radius of 25 miles. Accordingly, a large number of fires would be started very
quickly upon such an attack.
Extensive fires, concentrated within a large area, produce a fire storm. A "fire storm"
i s a high-intensity fire causing rapid consumption of oxygen and massive columns
of rising gases. The partial removal of air at the surface i s filled in by winds
moving with great force from the surrounding area, thereby accelerating the fire
storm itself until a l l combustible material i s consumed. In the napalm bomb
attacks on Hamburg and Tokyo during World War II, such fire storms were created.'
Under fire-storm conditions, the bomb shelters within these cities became containers within which occupants were either asphyxiated or charred. The numbers
killed during the fire storm raids in major German and Japanese cities equaled
and exceeded the number killed i n the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
High altitude photographs of the fire storms in progress show the spectacle of
entire cities going up in flames.
Sixty-five warheads of 20 megatons each (or three times that number of one-megaton
warheads) could be delivered on U.S. metropolitan industrial centers by various
means, including those that are both primitive and allow for l i t t l e warning time.
Soviet submarines could rise off the coast and launch primitive flying bombs
simi lar to the German V-1 weapons of World War II. Such instruments, launched
from a distance of about fifty miles off the coast, could be set to fly at low
altitudes to elude radar. Submarines could probably fire several such units before

interception by defensive planes or vessels.
Flying bombs of this sort could also be launched from freighters or even smaller
vessels. Again, freighters or warships off the coast could launch medium range
missiles to reach into the United States for 1,000 to 1,500 miles. Such missiles,
with short travel time, would not allow for very much warning even i f their flight
was initially detected.
Warheads could also be delivered by aircraft that are equipped for a one-way trip
to the target area. These could approach American coasts from the seaward or
southern side and at low altitudes.
This enumeration, which surely does not exhaust such possibilities, i s sxclusive
of intercontinental missiles of the largest class. In this analysis, I proceed on
the assumption that a determined agressor could mount multiple approaches to
each target area with high probability of penetrating a l l known defensive systems.
The meaning and the extent of this hypothetical attack i s indicated on the map
reproduced on the following page. Circles of 25 mile radius are drawn to scale over
meiropolitan industrial regions. The inset shows the New Y ork metropolitan region
in somewhat greater detail. These are the areas within which fire storm effects
of the sort discussed i n this paper would be expected from the explosion of the
indicated sorts of warheads.
These sixty-five urban placer correspond to the "Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas," a formal designation used by the Census of Population and the U.S.
Census of Manufacturers. The "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1960
(page 790) discloses that these 65 urban centers account for about two thirds of
total manufacturing and one third of the total population of the country.

T h e immediate e U e d s of wide deshuction by fire storm alone in these industrial
c m t e r s would k the destruction of the country as an industrial system.
Such destruction also breaks the network of interconnections among a l l industries.
Therefore the result i s far more extensive in the disruption of production capability
than i s indicated by the direct effects. .
When central sources of power, communication, and transportation are destroyed in
individual areas, then the interlocking fabric of the productional divi sion of labor
of society i s torn apart.

-

After such a nuclear attack the persons left alive in the areas between the metropolitan centers would be required, i n short order, to provide their food, clothing,
and shelter by primitive means
relying almost exclusively on manual methods.

--

People who could not provide their elementary needs in this way could not survive.
Regular supplies of fuel, power transportation and communication services that
are required for the customary operation of industrial faci Iities would no longer
be avui lable. farm tractors, under such circumstances, are transformed into metal
monuments by the absence of fuel. Factories and workshops could only produce as
far as self-contained power plants and fuel plus raw materials supplies permitted.
Industrial recovery, from disasters even as great as the Second World War occurred

under conditions where help became available from outside the disaster area. In
a world war fought between the East and the West, the major industrial centers of
the world would be destroyed.
Assistance would have to come, if at all, from outside the Worth Amarican and
European continents. Tha prasent level of industrial production in the Southern
Hemisphere does not indicate the availability of large surpluses in fuel, power
equipment tools, medical supplies, and consumer goods for use in saving survivors
in the Northern Hemisphera.
Would the Soviets attempt to destroy the American industry?
One suggestion i s that a 88rationa188
aggressor would strive to destroy direct
the missile and aircraft bases.
military targets only

--

This assumes that an attacker would be prepared to leave intact an industrial
system that could be used, after some delay, by an enraged population to mount
desperate acts of revenge against the attacker who had scored a first round by
interdicting weapons only.
Modem industry i s the essential base for nuclear warfare with elaborate delivery
systems and logistics of mass armies.
From h i s awlysis, I i t d i t unrrcrsonable to assume that industrial "recovery,"
as fi is called, could t& ploce in any time period tliot would allow for a meaningful restorafton of tndcnfrial life.
The assumption of a war&able 88movery" situation Is, however, one of the foundations of civil defense programs.
Insofar as American industry operates by means of a finely integrated division of
labor, the fire effect alone of a modest-sized nuclear attack would render this
society no longer viable as a significant production center of the world.

FOOTNOTES:
1. ''The Structure of the American Economy 1919 to 1939," by Wars i l y W.
Leontief and others, Oxford University Press, New York, 1951, second edition.
2. "Biological and Evironnuntal Effects of Nuclear War," Hearings before the
special subcommittee on radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th
Congress, June 22-26, 1959, P. 15.

3. "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," S. Glasstone, Atomic Energy Commission,
P. 299
4. See books by Martin Caidin, "The Night Hamburg Died," and '@ATorch to the
Enemy," both published by Ballantine Books, New York, 1960.

DANGERS OF THE SHELT-? PSYCHOLOGY
BY OTTO KLINEBERG
Chairman, Department of Social Psychology
Columbia University
For the individual, shelters are dangerous because they threaten to impair our
cherished values. For the nation, shelters are dangerous because they reduce our
wi 11 to fin d a peaceful solution to international problems and because they may
and therefore preparing for--war.
convince our adversaries that we are expecting

--

To b r o w beneath the ground for weeks, or even longer, means for human beings a
i n the
denial of most of the values which have been acquired slowly and
process of creating a democratic society. Instead of community there i s a splintering into isolated individuals or tiny groups. Instead of cooperation there i s violent
competition for available space. Instead of mutual oid, there i s a selfish struggle
for individual ~urvivol.
Psychiatrists speak of regression when adults behove i n a manner appropriate to
children. We may speak of social regression when a whole community behaves in
a manner characteristic of primitive. archaic, even animal-like existence, almost
to the point of recreating a Hobbesian war of a l l against all.

if our stake in the present ideological struggle i s to preserve a way of life, we
may well ask ourselves how much of our way of life would be maintained under
the conditions imposed by resort to shelters. Our democratic values would be
submerged i n a crass and cruel struggle for survival, made even more bitter because the struggle may be futile. There w i l l be imitations and frustrations arising
from the enforced ond continued contact with others for an extended period without
the relief of occasional privacy; there w i l l be anxieties concerning those from whom
one has been separated; there may even be a breakdown of psychological defences
because of worries about the uncertain future. Prolonged incarceration under such
conditions may be a devastating experience.
More important from society's viewpoint are the wider implications of a shelter
program for international relations.
Psychologists and sociologirts have both stressed the importance of our attitudes
as determining our behavior. When we believe that something i s going to happen,
we act accordingly, and as a consequence our be1ief s may be transformed into
real ity.
The Columbia University sociologist Merton, for example, speaks of "the self-fulfilling prophecy". Suppose, for example, that in a small community a rumor i s
started that the local bank i s in difficulties and i s about to close i t s doors. (We
shall have to suppose further that in this particular instance the depositors are
not protected by bank insurance.) The bank may on the contrary be perfectly sound,
and quite capable of handling a l l withdrawals which it may expect in the ordinary
course of events. The rumor spreads, however, and there i s a run on the bank, which
cannot meet the excessive demand for funds which i s now placed upon it, and it

does have to close i t s doors. The prediction has come true because people acted
upon it.
The most direct application of this concept to international relations, and more
particularly' to war, has been made by Havard Psychologist Al lport who speaks of
the ttprinciple of expectancy". In essence this means that i f we expect a certain
event, and act accordingly, that event i s more likely to occur. The expectancy of
war, therefore, increases the likelihood of war.
There i s nothing mysterious about this principle, if we add the proviso that the
acts must be related to the production of the event. If a l l of us expect rain tomorrow, that will make no difference to the weather, as obviously our behavior i s
irrelevant to this particular outcome. If, on the other hand, everybody expected
stocks to go down, and therefore sold out i n a hurry, that would create an atmosphere which could certainly contribute to a drop in their value.
The lute President Franklin Do Roosevelt had a clear conception of this mechanism
of "expectancys8 when he told us that a l l we had to fear ."was fear itself".
As far as war i s concerned, the expectation that it i s definitely coming would
prevent us from taking a l l possible measures to avoid it, and therefore make war
that much more probable. The reverse i s not necessarily true. War may come when
we least expect it. A l l that i s being said i s that, if we do expect it, the chances
of i t s occurrence are increased.

Thi s analysis has

important practical consequences in connection with shelters.
There i s a real danger that the building of shelters w i l l l u l l the people into a
false sense of security. It i s as if they were to say to themselves, consciously
or unconsciously,: '@Wehave shelters. We are safe. L e t war come.8s This reduces
our efforts to avoid war, ahd to that extent brings war, a little closer.
The shelter program might also bring war closer because of i t s potential effect
on the USSR. As the Political Scientist J o D o Singer (Bulletin of the Atmk
Scientists, Oct. 1961) has put it: "At the very least, it would suggest that we
have markedly raised our own estimate of the probability of stmtegic nuclear war,
and are therefore hoping to minimize its destructiveness." (p. 313) As a cons*
quence, our potential adversaries t # could assume that we are giving more serious
consideration to an opening blow ourselves", or he could assume "that we are
more convinced that he i s planning a surprise attack and are preparing against it.
In either case, it would be legitimate for him to give greater consideration to
opting for that very opening strike himselfn8.
This analysis i s psychologically sound, and reflects the dangerous potential effects of the shelter program not only on our own attitudes, but also on those of
our adversary. The tendency to regard shelters as ttinsurance88against attack i s
bared on a mi sunderstanding.
L i f e insurance does not cause us to take greater chances than we would normally,
nor i n the case of l i f e insurance, contrary to the case with shelters, do we have
adversaries who ate more likely to attack us just because we are insured.
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